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"ATOMGRAD" No. 1

The most important Soviet atomic center is located 300 kms. from the Iranian border.

About ten kilometers from Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia, the newly built highway which runs in a northeasterly direction along the ²Araks River valley is blocked off. Russian police carefully examine documents and belongings of travelers. All roads and paths branching off the highway are patrolled.

The area between Alago² and the Kanakiri Mountains is restricted and guarded by members of the N.K.V.D. This area, which is located at approximately 50 kilometers north-east of ^{Yerevan}~~Yerevan~~, contains the villages of ^{Gyumush}~~Gyumush~~, Akht^a~~a~~, Kanak^{ir}~~ir~~, and Sankigay. Specially selected N.K.V.D. agents are assigned to arrest and take to their nearest post any person not authorized to enter the said villages, and to shoot those who resist capture.

It is still impossible to determine exactly when the Politburo decided to set up an atomic center in this zone. But today the atomic installations in the ^{Gyumush}~~Gyumush~~-Akht^a~~a~~-Kanak^{ir}~~ir~~-Sankigay area are the most powerful in the Soviet Union.

The problem of electrifying such a vast atomic center prevented its being set up in Siberia. Electrification arrangements in Siberia would have been too difficult and time consuming. Soviet Armenia, on the other hand, with its ²Araks valley water resources offered better possibilities for providing the necessary electric power. Toward the end of 1946 all industries in Soviet Armenia were subjected to a strict rationing of electric power, which would perhaps indicate that the atomic center began to operate at that time.

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This center, which is called ATOMGRAD No. 1 by virtue of its importance, is under the direct administrative control of the central office of the N.K.V.D.

Full powers were reported to have been given personally to Beria by Stalin for the recruitment of the necessary scientists and other personnel, the procurement of materiel, and the supervision of uranium supplies obtained from the mines of ^{Jachymov, Oberschlema,} ~~Jachymov~~, Bad-Oberschlema, Tiflis, and Soviet Georgia. This information was received from comparatively important N.K.V.D. officials and scientists assigned to ATOMGRAD NO.1.

It is confirmed that a large part of the installations for physical experiments were removed from Germany and reassembled in ATOMGRAD NO. 1.

Since April of 1949 the Soviet scientists Joffe and Komorov and their assistants Flerov and Petrzhak have been at the ² ~~Nanga~~ valley installations. They are also assisted by a group of experienced young Soviet scientists as well as by German scientists, who were recruited and transferred by the Soviet occupation authorities in Germany. Their names remain a closely guarded secret.

The ² ~~Nanga~~ valley installations comprise four great units, located respectively at Kanak¹~~ia~~, Gumush, Akht²~~ka~~, and Sankigay. These units are connected by a road which originates at the head of the Yerevan highway. This area contains three small but well equipped airports, with many concrete runways, managed by the N.K.V.D. Transport planes of the N.K.V.D. are used exclusively.

Each unit of the atomic center is located on the outskirts of its corresponding village. All units are similar to each other in their general outline; they consist of enormous reinforced concrete buildings enclosed by a reinforced concrete wall, which is one meter in width and from five to seven meters in height. Each unit has a single entrance,

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which is heavily guarded day and night. In addition, at five hundred meter intervals on the wall there are turrets which are manned by N.K.V.D. guards at all times.

Beyond the enclosure, the first building encountered directly opposite to the entrance houses the N.K.V.D. detachment. It is a one-story building. All persons and materials entering the grounds must pass by this building. All personnel, scientists included, are carefully identified and searched at the end of each work shift. The N.K.V.D. building also houses the technical director in charge of operations and his closest collaborators, who must be considered virtual prisoners, for they cannot go anywhere without proper authorization. If one of them has to leave the enclosure, an N.K.V.D. automobile and armed guard are placed at his disposal.

The research laboratories are found beyond the N.K.V.D. building. They consist of massive structures which occupy large areas. Few structures, however, are as high as 20 m. The research, study, experiment, and storage rooms are all underground. In all probability ATOMGRAD No. 1 is the largest atomic research center in the world, judging by the number of persons employed there. According to our sources, the Sakingay unit alone (known as J-7), where the raw material receives a preliminary refining treatment, employs over 15,000 persons in three daily shifts, namely 5 A.M., 1 P.M., and 9 P.M. The G^yumush unit (W-66), which engages in the refinement of uranium, the separation of isotope 235, and the extraction of plutonium, employs nearly 10,000 persons in three daily shifts, namely 6 A.M., 2 P.M., and 10 P.M. The Kanak^{er} unit (Kz-3), which engages in plutonium research, employs nearly 20,000 persons in three daily shifts, namely 7 A.M., 3 P.M., and 11 P.M. The Akht^a unit (X-83), which consists of research, study, and medical training sections, employs over 25,000 persons in three daily shifts, namely 8 A.M., 2 P.M., and 12 P.M.

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Each building and department likewise has a specific code symbol; its own particular employees, who are not allowed to leave their working areas throughout the duration of their shifts. In addition, scientists assigned to different units may not exchange information. This undoubtedly retards the progress of operations, but this does not seem to concern the Soviet officials.

There are over 70,000 persons at the four units of the ² Sanga Valley atomic center. Relatively few of them, however, enjoy a free bargaining position and are engaged to work on a contract basis. This group consists mostly of scientists and technicians numbering less than 15,000. The remainder comprises deportees and former prisoners of war, who are mostly of German, Italian and Rumanian nationality. They enjoy, however, several important privileges not usually granted to prisoners in concentration camps. They work only 8 hours a day, receive plentiful and nourishing food, and occupy the homes vacated by the local population when the ATOMGRAD project was initiated. In addition, one portion of their wages is given to them, while the remainder is deposited at the administrative office. Those savings presumably will be turned over to the workers at the time of their eventual release. Some movie houses and theaters are in operation in the nearby villages, where the most deserving workers are taken from time to time under the strict surveillance of their guards. Instructive meetings, schools, and political lectures are also made available to the workers. On the other hand, work deficiencies and disciplinary violations are punished by long periods of solitary confinement, pay cuts, and suspension of food and amusement privileges. In more serious cases, where there may be found even the slightest suspicion of espionage, the workers are shipped to a regular prison or concentration camp. The strictest measures possible, in fact, are taken to prevent word of what is taking place in the Sanga valley from reaching the outside world.

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The scientists of ATOMGRAD No. 1 receive as much technical assistance as possible. The necessary instruments and other equipment are placed at their disposal. The findings of research conducted by universities and other cultural institutions are made available to them as well. The scientists, however, work and live in an atmosphere of suspicion; even a minor questionable situation usually means the end of scientists who come under suspicion.

Everyone, unit chiefs and laborers included, is kept under constant surveillance by the M.K.V.D. Armed agents of the M.K.V.D. actually keep guard over technicians, chemists, electrical engineers, and all other employees throughout their working hours.

The personnel of ATOMGRAD No. 1 comprises nearly 5,000 women, most of whom are deportees. They perform menial duties in the four hospitals (one in each village), in schools, recreation centers, and mess halls. Comparatively few women, who are graduates of universities and higher technical schools, are employed in some departments of the atomic energy installations. They are housed in separate dormitories, but are allowed to come into social contact with male employees after working hours. It is reported, in fact, that thus far nearly two hundred marriages have taken place at ATOMGRAD No. 1, which seems to indicate that family life is not entirely impossible there. Some Soviet scientists have even succeeded in obtaining authorization to take their families to the atomic center, where they are housed in separate homes.

The former inhabitants of the ² Ganga valley, nearly 20,000 persons in all, were compelled to leave their homes and most of their belongings immediately before the ATOMGRAD No. 1 project was initiated. They were transferred to Siberia or the Ukraine, where they settled in villages and ~~Kolkhozes~~.

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"In several departments of W-66 (Giumush) the employees report for duty equipped with gas masks. Two or three times a week an alarm is sounded and everyone participates in gas drills.

It is impossible to determine the true nature of the operations which are being carried on at Giumush. Some departments emit ether and ammonia odors; others send forth the almost imperceptible hum of generators in action. The equipment of these departments consists of a maze of steel and copper tubes, and a very large number of valves and dials of the most disparate and peculiar types.

It is impossible to learn anything directly from the employees for the following reasons: 1) employees are absolutely forbidden to discuss their work even among themselves; violators are punished most severely; 2) employees know nothing beyond their own duties, and even scientists may not be approached by unauthorized persons under any circumstances; 3) it is not known whether the products of W-66 are shipped to the other units of ATOMGRAD No. 1 or elsewhere."

It is learned from another report that "all the materials required by the installations of J-7, W-66, Kz-3, and X-83 are shipped there from Yerevan by means of truck convoys. The N.K.V.D. supplies all drivers, porters, and armed guards. These convoys always have a single destination and make no intermediary stops. Their arrival is usually preceded by a stiffening of security measures at the point of destination. The 50 km. stretch of road from Yerevan to the atomic units is constantly patrolled. All traffic other than the convoys themselves is halted, and small planes reconnoiter the skies above. On days when new shipments

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are expected, the antiaircraft batteries of the atomic units concerned are made ready for action.

Some equipment reaches ATOMGRAD No. 1 by air. This type of transportation is used mostly for precision instruments.

It has been impossible thus far to learn by what means and routes uranium supplies reach the atomic installations.

The products of the various atomic units are shipped in large trucks, which always go in pairs under considerable armed escort. On such occasions security measures along the route are as strict as they can be.

It has been possible to learn that these trucks bypass Yerevan, and head in a northeasterly direction. They generally take the Tiflis highway. In the vicinity of Yerevan the truck crews and their escorts are replaced by new personnel. The new escorts are generally smaller in number than the preceding ones. The first crews and escorting parties return immediately to their stations. They are not permitted to converse with anyone."

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Life at ATOMGRAD No. 1

We gather from the few police reports which we have been able to view, that life at ATOMGRAD No. 1 is generally gloomy and painful, although it has its rare moments of pleasantness.

For instance, the police detachment of unit W-66 (Gzumsh) received a communication on 12 December 1948 to the effect that during the night a woman employed at the mess hall of the first work shift had given birth to a baby girl. The communication described the mother as a native of Romankovo in Ukraine, who had worked in a concentration camp in the Ural region for a year and had been in the employe of W-66 for six months. The communication added that this was the first recorded childbirth at W-66, but gave no indication as to whether any special arrangements would be made to care for mother and child.

A few days later the police of W-66 prepared a monthly report, which stated that during the preceding month (November) 246 cases of illness were reported, 138 of which were successfully treated in the local infirmaries within a few days, while the remainder required hospitalization. Meanwhile, there occurred 5 deaths: one was accidental; four were due to illness. Police officials performed 7 marriage ceremonies, 6 of which involved deportees, including a 29 year old German electrician named Rudolph Geisser, born in Weimar, and captured by the Russians at Kirovograd in 1943. The seventh marriage involved two Russian free workers.

A couple desiring to be married must apply in writing to the local police office. Their application must bear the signatures of two witnesses and contain affidavits signed by the applicants' supervisors. If the application is accepted, the applicants undergo a complete physical examination and are joined in marriage by a police official, who enters their names in a special register and authorizes them to live together

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in a house of his choosing. After the marriage ceremony, the newlyweds proceed to their home, where they await their next work shift.

Only one marriage was reported from Sankigay (J-7) during November 1948. Several cases of illness, including a serious poliomyelitis case, occurred at Akhti (X-83). A total of 9 deaths, including 4 accidental ones, was reported from Kanak~~ka~~. A Lithuanian deportee employed at Kanak~~ka~~ was reported to the disciplinary committee.

The 1948 Christmas season brought no change in routine at ATOMGRAD No. 1. There were no work stoppages, no special menus, and no religious services. A short report prepared by the police detachment of unit X-83 on 1 January 1949 stated that a group of Italian prisoners of war were found in a drunken state in dormitory No. 10th by a police squad on night duty. The source of the vodka drunk by the Italian workers could not be ascertained. Several charwomen and a Russian employee were found to have been molested. This report was particularly interesting, because it contained a footnote which read "no action taken."

Let us turn now to the individual files kept on the "citizens" of ATOMGRAD No. 1. The following information has been extracted at random from the voluminous records maintained by the police detachments of the various atomic units.

The first file to reach us deals with "mechanic Pietr Soryatchuk, born at Tischanska (Don district) on 12 March 1913." He is a "free" worker employed by unit X-83 since 2 February 1949; receives 285 rubles gross every fifteen days; is housed in a dormitory for men; and is entitled to extra food rations because he performs heavy work. This file, which is brought up to date every two weeks, states further that Soryatchuk is a serious-minded and conscientious worker, whose conduct is satisfactory in every way. Often he requests overtime duty and receives double pay for each overtime hour, which is paid to him by separate payroll.

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His contract calls for a three-year term of duty. It is very likely that at the end of his first year of duty he will be promoted to the position of section supervisor with a salary increase to 310 or 320 rubles per pay period. It must be admitted that this is quite a sum, considering the fact that food, lodging, and clothing are paid for by the administration. Soryatechuk's file goes on to say that he became a member of the Communist Party in 1936, but was not very active. He served in a Russian antiaircraft artillery unit during World War II and became crippled as a result of a serious leg wound. His political education is elementary and his political contributions almost nil.

Another file deals with "assistant chemist Walter Getz, born at Saarbruck on 5 June 1915"; former German prisoner of war; former sergeant paratrooper; wounded; and captured at Voroshilovgrad; deported to ATOM-GRAD No. 1 from a concentration camp following his application for employment dated 15 November 1948. Getz works at X-83. He is a dependable and accurate worker, and is well liked by his superiors. He has had good political training and has applied for membership in the Communist Party. He is currently taking entrance examinations. After working hours he always attends political meetings where he often delivers speeches to his fellow deportees.

Another file concerns "mechanic Alfred Radekotze, born in Prague on 27 August 1898, Russian citizen since 1930"; free worker; employed by a munitions plant near Denpropetrovsk before signing a 3-year contract with Unit X-83. Radekotze is a good worker with excellent political training. He also holds a position in the propaganda office of the local Communist Party section. He is married, but has no children. His wife, a Russian national, also works at X-83.

It would appear, from the foregoing that life is not too difficult for the "citizens" of ATOMGRAD No.1, and this may well apply to some of them; but we possess a great deal of information to the contrary.

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For instance, the file dealing with J. Lenokwtis, a Lithuanian "laborer", age 23, shows that he was deported to ATOMGRAD No. 1 from a concentration camp, where he had been kept in solitary confinement for a total of nearly two years as a result of various offenses charged against him. He was assigned to work as a laborer in a warehouse of unit X-83. The file describes him as "intelligent and learned", but "anti-communist" and "inclined to Fascist sentiments". Decided attempts have been made to "convert" Lenokwtiz to Communist doctrines at the concentration camp as well as at ATOMGRAD No. 1, but he still refuses to give in. He arrived at unit X-83 on 7 April 1949 and was soon reprimanded for "poor effort". He was assigned to a dormitory occupied by Russian, German and Lithuanian deportees, and immediately undertook to "subvert" his roommates. He also carried on a violent anti-bolshevik campaign among the workers of his department. The young Lithuanian deportee is known to have attacked the atomic research activities of ATOMGRAD No. 1 in his "subversive" speeches. He is quoted as having delivered the following speech to his roommates. "We have been deported here because we have had the courage to oppose their filthy regime, or rather because we have been naive enough to tell them exactly what we thought of their several theories. Thus they have captured us and put us to work for the strengthening of their own system, just as the Nazis once did. But could it be that we are working for the cause of peace? Or building hospitals, roads, and houses? Not at all. We, the arch enemies of Russia, are actually forced to make atomic bombs, with which she will oppose the bombs of those other fine humanitarian gentlemen in the United States. We are compelled to provide this colossal destructive machine with the deadliest means of destruction. The H hour of the bloodiest of all wars is to be determined by our present activities. We know, therefore, exactly what we are working for: war; we know for whom we are working: the architect of chaos; and we know against what we are working: human freedom and dignity. Then what can we do? We can do nothing to stop

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this destructive machine, but we can refuse to contribute to the preparation of the greatest of all crimes: better still, we can retard this preparation."

The foregoing appears underlined in red and bears the notation "incitement to sabotage." The file also includes a conversation which took place once in a storage room during working hours between Leonkwtiz and a police informer, wherein they are identified as "L" and "I" respectively.

L - There is no way of averting World War III. We are not informed here, but it may well be that war already has broken out somewhere, although not in Russia.

I - How can you say that? We have no news from the outside world.

L - If Russia were engaged in war, you would see a tremendous display of armed might in this area....

I - Then, according to you, there must be war.

L - Not according to me. According to the Soviet system. Besides the fact that all dictatorships lead to war, the Soviet regime wants war, total and absolute war, for that regime needs such a war in order to survive and initiate the true Soviet way of living. At any rate, what is being produced here is a clear indication of the intentions of Stalin and his comrades. Atomic bombs are not made for the purpose of spreading the doctrines of a political party, much less to cure hay fever.. .

I - It may be argued that they are being produced in order to counterbalance atomic developments in the United States.

L - Certainly; but that does not alter the fact that we are justified in our belief that thus far a new world war has been averted only because the Soviet Union does not as yet consider its atomic armament equal to that of the United States."

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this destructive machine, but we can refer to a reference to the preparation of the present of all of these latter skill, we can refer to this preparation."

The foregoing reports mentioned in red and bears the notation "for reference to intelligence." The file also includes a conversation which took place some to a person from during working hours between Ganshukle and a police informer, who is identified as "H" and "H" respectively.

H - There is no way of starting World War III. We are not informed here, but it may well be that war already has broken out somewhere, although not in Russia.

I - How can you say that? We have no news from the outside world.

H - If Russia were engaged in war, you would see a tremendous display of almost night in this area.

I - Then, according to you, there must be war.

H - Not according to me. According to the Soviet system, besides the fact that all disturbances lead to war, the Soviet system wants war, total and absolute war, for that regime needs such a war in order to survive and imitate the true Soviet way of living. At any rate, what is being produced here is a clear indication of the intentions of Stalin and his associates. Atomic bombs are not made for the purpose of spreading the doctrine of a political party, much less to start any fever.

I - It may be argued that they are being produced in order to cause a balance among developments in the United States.

H - Certainly; but that does not alter the fact that we are justified in our belief that thus far a new world war has been averted only because the Soviet Union does not as yet consider its atomic armament equal to that of the United States."

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It would be difficult to relate here all the reports turned in by the various informers assigned to observe young Leonkwtiz. It is deemed advisable, therefore, to give only the last available report, which follows in outline form.

"At the end of his shift he did not leave with the others, as is customary. He remained in the storage area for nearly ten minutes. An immediate check was made, and it was discovered that several pieces of machinery had been moved to new positions. (Author's note: Apparently, every instrument and tool is assigned its own particular storage space in order to avert harmful delays) It is probable that several spare parts of... (Author's note: incomprehensible names, perhaps, of machines or instruments) were found damaged."

The introductory part of the report ends with the statement that Leonkwtiz operates alone. His fellow workers listen to him willingly, but do not follow him for fear of being suspected by the police.

"In the dormitory young Leonkwtiz stands close to the entrance when he harangues his roommates, in order to hear approaching steps and quickly disband his audience. He says: "We must do something at all costs. We must stop being their accomplices. They hurt us; we must endeavor to hurt them. It would be a great satisfaction to us to assail our guards but that would be impossible. It is better, therefore, simply to retard operations. Sometimes a trivial oversight can cause production to slow up considerably. What does it cost us? And besides, it affords us the opportunity to dupe their perfect organization. When they begin to suspect us, we interrupt our game temporarily, only to resume it at a more opportune time."

(Informer's Comment): "Some of his listeners tell him that he is mad; others laugh. Leonkwtiz becomes excited. They tell him to stop his activities, lest he cause difficulties for everyone. Leonkwtiz begins to insult the government and the police. The approaching steps of the roving patrol puts an end to the session."

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At the end of the report the following words appear underlined in red: "Charge d with sabotage." The report is dated 11 June 1949.

What became of the young Lithuanian rebel? What moral did his fellow workers derive from his case?

The story of engineer Schwadkyan is also significant. His file is kept in the office of the police detachment of W-66 at Giumush. It reads "Engineer Fiodorovich Schwadkyan, born at Tiflis on 9 September 1901; former chief of the assembly department of the United Industrial Plants of Makeyewka; sentenced to 5 years of deportation on charges of inefficiency." An explanatory note states that this inefficiency referred mostly to low-quality material produced by his department. He arrived at W-66 on 7 December 1948 after several months of imprisonment in a prison located in Staline province. He was assigned to the assembly of machinery. He proved to be an excellent worker and, after a few months at W-66 was put in charge of a section and given a good salary.

The first note appearing in this file states: "Excellent workers; expert in his work; remarkable influence on his coworkers; highly efficient. His previous punishment has had a noticeable effect on him; it is evident that he is anxious to effect a rehabilitation."

The second note, added after Schwadkyan's promotion, reads: "Satisfactory in every respect. His section is one of the most efficient in W-66. Great ability to supervise work and deal with his subordinates. Excellent political training."

The third note describes his accomplishments during the first four months of his assignment. The general tone is similar to that of the preceding notes; it ends with very favorable comments.

The last note is dated 18 May 1949 and states: "Serious inefficiency

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in the work of the section. Great defects noticed in the material produced; a machine okayed by the section has been found defective and has caused considerable delays in production. The section chief has been found completely responsible for this." This phrase follows underlined in red: "Charged with sabotage."

The constant preoccupation of the police of the "atomic zone" is caused by fear of western espionage. While the ATOMGRAD No. 1 region is desirable from the purely technical standpoint, it presents extremely serious problems of security and protection in view of the nearness of the Turkish and Iranian borders. In spite of the tight network of surveillance maintained by the Russians along the whole length of those borders, the numerous possibilities of infiltration on the part of American and British secret agents cause extreme discomfort for Soviet counter-espionage in the region of ATOMGRAD No. 1.

It is reasonable to assume that what is produced in the ^Zangra valley is no longer a mystery to western espionage. That is the reason for the endless precautions taken to the endless precautions taken to establish a veritable neutralizing security belt around ATOMGRAD No. 1.

Sometimes a nomad or a group of nomads cross the Turkish or Iranian borders clandestinely. Most of them are caught by the Soviet police, who use no discrimination whatsoever. They are lucky if they end up in a prison or a concentration camp; more often the Soviet patrols open fire on them.

No aircraft is authorized to fly over ATOMGRAD No. 1. The skies above the ^Zangra valley are reserved exclusively to aircraft employed by the atomic establishments in the area. All other aircraft, even if belonging to the Soviet Air Force, will be fired upon by the numerous antiaircraft batteries stationed in the valley. No such incident has occurred thus far.

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The files of the police detachment of X-83 relate several episodes in connection with western espionage activities around Atomgrad No. 1.

An Armenian preacher from Yerevan gave the X-83 police their first cause for anxiety. The preacher, presumably under a mystic spell, used to give declamatory speeches on the highway and directed invectives against those who, according to him, had deviated from the right path indicated by the Lord and had decided to pry the secrets of nature for destructive purposes. Then, as if to furnish proof of what he asserted, he would point toward the ⁷Angra valley and its atomic establishments. "Those, he would say, "are nothing but the devil's own workshops!"

The police of X-83 soon received word of the thoughtless preacher was interrupted right in the middle of one of his impassioned sermons by a large number of Soviet agents, who forced him into an automobile and drove off at great speed in the direction of Akhtla. The poor preacher was subjected to extensive interrogation. His inquisitors were convinced that they were dealing with an obvious case of espionage and wanted to know details concerning his organization. The report does not indicate whether or not the preacher ever confessed anything. It is known, however, that he was never seen again along the roads of Yerevan.

Another report states that during the winter of 1948 - 1949 a small police patrol received word from an observation post located at Tabriz that a British agent was attempting to cross the Iranian border. Counter-espionage agents swung into action at once and succeeded in locating the British agent in an Iranian frontier town, whereupon they arranged to take him clandestinely into Soviet territory, where they arrested him. The report adds only the fact that the British agent was a Patrick Jempson, age 43.

A similar case occurred in February 1949, but had a different ending. The X-83 police received information from Tabriz that an American agent, whose description was known, was about to enter into Soviet ter-

ritory. Soviet agents located him in Iran and offered to help him cross the frontier upon advance payment of a large sum. The crossing of the frontier was undertaken at night at a place which appeared to have been left unguarded by the Russians. The American agent became suspicious and, after reaching Soviet territory, suddenly escaped from his traveling companions with the aid of darkness and of the surrounding woods. The Soviet agents gave the alarm and the entire area became alive with policemen and gun shots. The American agent escaped, but there was no indication that he might have returned to Iran. On the contrary, the next morning there footprints were found which indicated that he had made his way deeper into Soviet territory. All roads in that region were blocked at once, and a tight dragnet was undertaken. The American agent, of course, never succeeded in reaching the ² Sangra valley, but it is still a mystery how he was able to escape the search conducted by an entire police brigade and several extremely able Soviet counter-espionage agents.

The report admits defeat in terse terms. A supplementary note states that information has since been received from Turkey to the effect that a person answering the description of the escaped American agent has been located there.

Another report states that one day a guard of X-83 noticed a pigeon flying into a garage and flying away shortly afterwards in a southerly direction. The guard noticed the same occurrence a few days later and reported the incident at once. Finally, it was discovered that the pigeon's destination was the office of a metallurgical establishment, where thirty-two persons were arrested. The pigeon was captured and a small celluloid case was found tied to one of its legs. It was learned from the first interrogation of the prisoners that a mechanical draftsman employed in the metallurgical establishment had a mania for courier pigeons and possessed a small brood of them. He used courier pigeons as

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a means of communication with a fellow worker employed in a garage of X-83. The two friends were able to prove that their messages had been of a purely personal nature. It was established also that the draftsman was homosexual. In view of these extenuating circumstances, both workers were only "deprived of freedom" for 3 years.

As pointed out previously, no one at ATOMGRAD No. 1 knows much beyond his own sphere of activity. As a result, the police have few if any occasions to deal with violations of internal security. Once the police learned that a woman worker had boasted to her roommates that she knew perfectly not only the organization and production of X-83, but also the total number of bombs produced since the beginning of operations at ATOMGRAD No. 1. A police investigation ascertained that this woman was familiar with technical terms used at the plant, although she was employed only in the production of transformers. "hereupon she was arrested and confusedly related all that she knew, which turned out to be pure fantasy, completely unrelated to reality. Her knowledge of technical terms was explained by the fact that she was the paramour of an engineer employed in a highly secret department. The result was that the engineer and the woman were "deprived of freedom" for 3 and 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ years respectively.

It goes without saying that more serious incidents must have taken place in the "atomic zone" of the ² Sangra valley, but I have been unable to obtain sufficient information to relate them.

According to unconfirmed reports however, the most serious incident involved a German scientist, who had been kidnapped from his home in Berlin at the beginning of 1946 and deported to ATOMGRAD No. 1. It is reported that he escaped from unit J-7 in May 1949 taking with him various charts related to the output and operations of that unit, which had virtually been managed by him. Rumor has it that he was eventually

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captured by the Russians in the vicinity of the Turkish frontier.

It must be understood that the above rumors are unconfirmed. But what is certain is that no employee of ATOMGRAD No. 1 is permitted to leave. In fact, what the Soviet police do there may be defined as the devil's own work.

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